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Abstract 
 This paper explores the relationship between funding liquidity and credit default swap 
(CDS) spreads, evidencing the effects of the regulatory changes brought about by the 
introduction of the CDS Small Bang reforms for CDS contracts on European reference 
entities in June 2009. Using panel estimations, this study provides evidence that a 
tightening of funding liquidity increases CDS spreads, an effect which is three times larger 
in magnitude for high-CDS entities compared to low-CDS firms. This relationship 
increases in magnitude and significance after the implementation of the CDS Small Bang 
reforms which introduced fixed coupons for trading CDSs, leading to the exchange of 
upfront fees between CDS contract parties.  
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1. Introduction 
What determines the spreads on credit default swaps (CDS)? In this paper, we investigate 
how funding liquidity, defined as the ease with which traders can acquire funds and 
finance their operations, impacts CDS spreads. At least three clear motives for this 
examination can be identified: firstly, a tightening of funding constraints impairs the 
capacity of dealers to take sides in new CDS contracts as they face higher costs of 
hedging their positions and higher inventory costs (Tang and Yan, 2008); secondly, the 
Global Financial Crisis saw both a large drop in funding liquidity and the accusation that 
holding CDS positions exacerbated financial market complacency about risk; and thirdly, 
the set of regulatory reforms known as the CDS Small Bang, were introduced in the 
European market in June 2009 to facilitate standardization and central clearing. The 
introduction of this latter regulation gave rise to upfront fees that need to be exchanged 
between CDS buyers and sellers and are thus more likely to make spreads more sensitive 
to tightening funding conditions, given the additional funding to be raised.   
The CDS market saw a period of unprecedented growth in the mid-2000s, with the 
gross notional amount of outstanding CDS contracts rising to approximately $57 trillion 
by June 2008 according to the Bank for International Settlements data. Tang and Yan 
(2008) argue that this growth stemmed from the need of banks and insurance companies 
to hedge their bond and loan exposures and from the willingness of hedge funds to use 
CDS as a tool for speculating on credit risk. Early studies (e.g., Longstaff et al., 2005) 
contend that CDS spreads (hereafter ‘spreads’), which represent the premiums paid by 
the buyer to insure against the default of the reference name, mainly contain information 
relating to the credit risk of the reference entity. However, more recently, studies 
highlight the importance of liquidity components such as CDS liquidity (e.g., Tang and 
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Yan, 2008; Bongaerts et al., 2011; Coro et al., 2013; Pires et al., 2015) and individual 
firm equity liquidity (Das and Hanouna, 2009). 
Although the effect of funding liquidity has been examined in other markets its 
influence in CDS markets remains under investigated. We remedy this by employing 
monthly data on a sample spanning the period January 2008 to March 20132, a balanced 
panel of CDS entities in the European iTraxx index and associated firm-specific credit 
and liquidity variables as well as macroeconomic factors which have been previously 
documented to affect spreads. The funding illiquidity3 measures employed, namely the 
three-month European TED spread measure (EuTed) and the three-month Euribor-Eurepo 
spread (EuRepo), are related to interbank interest rates and reflect the cost of acquiring 
funds to finance operations. 
Our panel estimations provide several new results. In particular, it is found that 
changes in funding illiquidity have a highly significant and positive effect on CDS 
spreads; in line with the hypothesis that a tightening of funding liquidity encourages CDS 
protection sellers to reduce the supply of contracts as they incur increased inventory and 
hedging costs, and subsequently reducing CDS liquidity. Notably, in the post-CDS Small 
Bang period we find that this positive effect is of much higher magnitude. Moreover, we 
find that changes in funding illiquidity have a three times larger effect on high-spread as 
compared to low-spread CDS entities, the former’s higher default risk causing a higher 
sensitivity to funding liquidity considerations4. When we combine the post-Small Bang 
period and high-spread entities, it is found that funding liquidity changes are the most 
                                                          
2 The sample starts in January 2008 to preserve the number of firms in our sample due to data availability on 
CDS quotes as well as associated stock market data on reference entities. The sample ends in March 2013, as 
the credit valuation adjustment applied to the price of derivative instruments to account for counterparty 
credit risk was implemented in the first quarter of 2013. 
3 Typically, the extant literature refers to funding ‘illiquidity’ measures rather than funding liquidity.  
4 Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) predict that riskier assets are more sensitive to funding effects. Pires et 
al. (2015) further evidence that other explanatory variables have a larger impact on high-spread entities.  
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important determinant of spread changes in terms of explanatory power, among all 
liquidity variables investigated.  
Through this study we contribute to two strands of literature. Firstly, we add to the 
literature investigating the effects of funding constraints on financial markets (e.g., 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Gromb and Vayanos, 2002; Gromb and Vayanos, 
2010; Comerton-Forde et al., 2010). Most notably, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) 
theorize that under certain market conditions, such as when capital availability is scarce, 
a deterioration of funding liquidity negatively impacts investors willingness and ability to 
invest in high-risk securities as they add on more risk, thus leading to reductions in 
market liquidity and increased volatility. The resulting reduction in market liquidity 
further increases the sensitivity of market liquidity to future funding liquidity changes.  
Secondly, by documenting that funding illiquidity changes affect spread changes, 
this paper contributes to the growing literature investigating the determinants of CDS 
spreads (e.g., Blanco et al. 2005; Tang and Yan, 2008; Ericsson et al. 2009; Greatrex 
2009; Coro et al. 2013; Annaert et al. 2013; Galil et al. 2014; Pires et al. 2015). Research 
examining the determinants of spreads has gone a long way in explaining these, from 
early studies attributing the level of the spread of an entity mainly to credit risk variables 
(e.g. Longstaff et al. 2005, Zhang et al. 2009) to ascribing a substantial part of the spread 
variability to liquidity components and market-wide variables (e.g. Bongaerts et al. 2011; 
Coro et al. 2013; Galil et al. 2014; Pires et al. 2015). To this end, our work now stresses 
the importance of allowing for funding illiquidity.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 outlines the hypotheses, data 
and variables to be used in the analysis and section 3 presents the models employed. 
Section 4 provides the empirical results, whilst section 5 details the robustness checks 
performed. Finally, section 6 presents some policy recommendations and section 7 
concludes.  
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2. Hypotheses and Data 
2.1 Hypotheses 
When considering how funding illiquidity might affect CDS spreads, Kamga and Wilde 
(2017) consider that a funding liquidity contraction drives CDS traders to steer away 
from risky assets, thus reducing the liquidity of the CDS market, in line with the 
theoretical model proposed by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). Furthermore, 
confirming these predictions, Junge and Trolle (2015) construct a measure of CDS 
market liquidity which correlates strongly, among other factors, with funding liquidity, 
and find that liquidity risk is priced in the cross-section of single-name CDS returns. The 
above-mentioned studies suggest that funding liquidity positively impacts CDS market 
liquidity. However, as shown, among others, by Bongaerts et al. (2011) and Coro et al. 
(2013), spreads are highly sensitive to changes in CDS liquidity, a deterioration of CDS 
liquidity increasing spreads, as CDS protection sellers require a premium for illiquidity. 
Therefore, we would expect funding illiquidity changes to positively impact CDS spread 
changes through their effect on CDS illiquidity.  
Relatedly, the CDS Small Bang, was introduced in the European market on 20th 
June 2009 to facilitate standardization and central clearing. Before the protocol changes 
came to effect, trading of CDS contracts was done at a coupon rate that fixed the contract 
value to zero on the inception day, no upfront fee needing to be exchanged (Markit, 2009; 
Wang et al. 2018). Among other regulatory changes, the CDS Small Bang conventions 
restrict coupon rates to be fixed at 25bps, 100bps, 500bps and 1000bps (Markit, 2009). 
However, the introduction of fixed coupons gave rise to upfront fees that need to be 
exchanged between CDS buyers and sellers, the size of the fee depending on how far 
away the spread level is from the fixed coupons at which the contract settles (Wang et al. 
2018). Periods when funding is tight should thus more strongly negatively affect spread 
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liquidity after the implementation of the CDS Small Bang regulations, due to the need of 
paying additional upfront fees for trading CDS. The resulting decline in CDS liquidity 
would then be transmitted onto spreads as CDS traders require a premium for illiquidity. 
Finally, a priori, it might be expected that high-spread CDS firms are more affected 
by changes in funding illiquidity as they carry relatively more default risk; a tightening of 
funding liquidity leading these entities closer to the default barrier compared to low-CDS 
spread firms. Moreover, on average, high-spread firms are more likely to have a spread 
further away from one of the fixed coupons introduced after the CDS Small Bang. 
Therefore, a higher fee would need to be exchanged between buyers and sellers for 
contracts written on high-spread reference entities, leading to a greater reduction in 
individual CDS liquidity and a higher spread.  
The hypotheses examined in this study can be summarized as follows: Firstly, we 
argue that a tightening (relaxation) of funding liquidity increases (decreases) CDS 
spreads through its effect on CDS liquidity. Secondly, we suggest that the effect of 
funding liquidity changes on spread changes is stronger in the post-June 2009 period, due 
to the introduction of an upfront fee that is exchanged between CDS buyers and sellers, 
unless the spread level of an entity is exactly equal to one of the fixed coupon payments. 
Thirdly, we hypothesize that high-spread firms display more sensitivity to changes in 
funding liquidity than low-spread firms.  
 
2.2 Data 
Our dataset combines two main sources, Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
From the former we source data on CDS spread mid, bid and ask quotes as well as market 
rates on the three-month Euribor rate and German Government BuBill maturing in three 
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months.5 From the latter, we source stock market data such as bid, ask and adjusted close 
stock prices for the reference entities on which the CDS contracts are written. 
Macroeconomic interest rate data such as the ten-year and three-year Euro-area 
Government Benchmark bond yields, stock market index and market wide implied 
volatility are also collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The three-month Eurepo 
rate is collected from the European Money Market Institute (EMMI) database.  
The dataset covers a period of 63 months, from January 2008 to March 2013. The 
companies selected are all the non-financial companies included in the European iTraxx 
index on March 2013 (index roll 19)6.  The Markit iTraxx Europe index comprises of 125 
investment-grade entities with the most liquid single-name CDSs in the European market. 
The constituent list includes 100 non-financial firms and 25 companies that operate in the 
financial sector. Previous studies using data from the iTraxx Europe index include 
Alexander and Kaeck (2008) and Breitenfellner and Wagner (2012) which examine the 
determinants of the CDS indices, Berndt and Obreja (2010) who use index data to 
construct a factor mimicking economic catastrophe risk and Junge and Trolle (2015) who 
construct a new measure of CDS market liquidity and analyse whether liquidity risk 
impacts expected CDS returns. 
Following Bai and Wu (2016), we restrict our sample to non-financial entities due to 
the important differences in terms of regulation, funding methods, corporate governance, 
agency problems, capital structure, leverage levels and calculation of distance-to-default 
                                                          
5 Das and Hanouna (2009) and Nashikkar et al. (2011) also use CDS information obtained from Bloomberg 
in their analyses of determinants of CDS spreads and CDS bond-basis, respectively.  
6 The European Markit iTraxx index constituent list is reviewed with respect to liquidity and investment 
grade of entities every six months, with one index roll occurring in March and one in September. To 
preserve the number of companies in our cross-section, we also include any entities which were listed as part 
of the Markit iTraxx index as of March 2013, but which have been previously part of the Markit iTraxx 
Crossover Index encompassing the 75 most liquid sub-investment grade entities due to a rating downgrade 
event occurring during our sample period. It is worth noting that throughout the time frame of the study, the 
constituent list of the European iTraxx index changes are minor. This observation is also highlighted by 
Breitenfellner and Wagner (2012) who find only neglectable effects of index roll changes on spread changes.   
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measures between financial and non-financial firms highlighted by De Haan and Vlahu 
(2016) and Duan and Wang (2012). Furthermore, amongst others, Alexander and Kaeck 
(2008) provide evidence that several variables that affect CDS spreads of non-financial 
entities do not impact spreads of companies from the financial sector. Following the 
recommendations outlined in Coro et al. (2013), we further restrict our sample to include 
only CDS contracts that satisfy the following conditions: the CDS contract maturity is five 
years, the most-liquid CDS maturity (Meng and Gwilym, 2008), contracts are 
denominated in Euros, and the underlying debt is senior-unsecured. Finally, we only select 
entities for which we can source stock market data for the entire time-series from 
Thomson Datastream.  
Restricting our data using the above-mentioned filters yields us a balanced panel of 
76 European entities observed throughout a period of 63 months. In line with Collin-
Dufresne et al. (2001), Coro et al. (2013), Galil et al. (2014) and Pires et al. (2015) we 
conduct our empirical analysis using monthly data, as CDS contracts are known to not 
trade frequently. In his analysis, Zhu (2006) finds that only 20% of days in his sample 
period contain valid CDS quotes.  
2.3 Credit default swaps 
Figure 1 plots the evolution of average CDS spread levels (panel (a)) and spread changes 
(panel (b)) over time. The solid lines represent averages for our entire sample, while the 
dotted lines represent averages for the top and bottom terciles of the respective 
distributions. We note a great deal of variation in spread levels and spread changes 
throughout our sample period. Investigating panel (a), we note that average spread levels 
fluctuated from highs of 253 bps in December 2008 to lows of 76 bps recorded in January 
2008 and December 2009. Moreover, the average spread in the upper tercile of CDS 
spreads displays even greater variation, reaching peaks of 445 bps in December 2008 and 
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270 bps in September 2011 and lows of 104 bps in January 2008 and 108 bps in December 
2009. Examining panel (b), we note that average spread changes also display variation 
throughout our sample, from large negative changes of -57 bps in January 2009 and -35 
bps in October 2011 to large positive changes of +73 bps in October 2008. The very large 
variation in average spread changes for the top tercile of spreads during the financial crisis 
is also remarkable, spreads widening by 138 bps in October 2008 at the peak of the crisis 
and shrinking by 98 bps and 96 bps in January 2009 and April 2009, respectively.  
In the empirical analysis, we focus on examining spread changes, rather than spread 
levels because, after examining stationarity via the panel unit root test of Levin et al. 
(2002), we cannot reject the null of a unit root for spread levels, whereas spread changes 
are stationary.7  Moreover, as Ericsson et al. (2009) notes, spread differences should be 
harder to explain than CDS levels. Therefore, by performing our estimations in first 
differences, we perform a stricter test of CDS determinants. For each month t and 
company i, spread changes are calculated as the first difference of spread levels from the 
last day of each month, as shown in equation (1): 
                                 𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 −  𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1                                             (1) 
By performing panel regressions using first differences of our variables, rather than levels, 
we contribute to the growing literature examining the determinants of CDS spread changes 
(e.g. Collin-Dufresne et al, 2001; Ericsson et al, 2009; Greatrex, 2009). 
2.4 Funding liquidity 
Low funding liquidity leads CDS protection sellers to steer away from risky assets, thus 
decreasing the liquidity of the CDS market (Kamga and Wilde, 2017). This argument is 
supported by the findings of Tang and Yan (2008) who find that a tightening of funding 
                                                          
7 Previous studies investigating the determinants of CDS spread changes in the European market (Coro et al, 
2013; Annaert et al, 2013) and in the U.S. market (Galil et al, 2014) also found evidence of non-stationarity 
in spread levels. 
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liquidity determines dealers with excess inventory to face higher costs of hedging their 
positions and higher inventory costs, in turn affecting the supply of CDS contracts in the 
market. Separately, Junge and Trolle (2015) construct a measure of CDS market liquidity 
that correlates strongly, among others, with funding costs, and go on to find that liquidity 
risk is priced in the cross-section of single-name CDS returns. These arguments suggest 
that funding illiquidity affects spreads through their effect on CDS market illiquidity. As 
shown by Bongaerts et al. (2011), Coro et al. (2013) and Pires et al. (2015), CDS market 
liquidity, as well as individual CDS liquidity, are important determinants of spreads, a 
decrease in CDS liquidity leading to a widening of spreads.  
Furthermore, we expect funding illiquidity changes to have a stronger impact on 
CDS spread changes after June 2009, due to the implementation of the CDS Small Bang 
which brought about a set of convention changes to the European CDS market meant to 
improve central clearing (Markit, 2009). Before the CDS Small Bang convention changes 
came into effect, CDS contracts were traded at a coupon rate that set the contract value to 
zero on the start date of the contract, thus no upfront fee was needed (Wang et al, 2018). 
According to Markit (2009), one of the changes implemented through the CDS Small 
Bang is the implementation of fixed coupons (25bps, 100bps, 500bps and 1000bps). If the 
spread of an entity at the date of the contract does not amount exactly to one of the 
implemented fixed coupons, upfront fees are exchanged depending on the spread level, 
with fees being larger the further away the spread is from the newly established fixed 
coupons. Periods of tight funding should have a large impact on spreads after the 
implementation of the new regulations, due to the need of paying additional fees for 
trading CDSs which would decrease CDS market liquidity. These effects are closely tied 
to those documented by Wang et al. (2018) in relation to the CDS Big Bang, a similar 
protocol to the CDS Small Bang implemented in the U.S. market prior to the introduction 
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of the CDS Small Bang in the European market. Wang et al. (2018) go on to find that the 
higher funding cost due to the introduction of upfront fees for trading CDSs reduces CDS 
liquidity and increases spread volatility. 
The above arguments suggest an expected positive relationship between funding 
illiquidity changes and spread changes, effect which should be larger after June 2009 due 
to the implementation of the CDS Small Bang regulations. We use two proxies to measure 
funding illiquidity. Firstly, we examine the European TED spread measure (EuTed) 
calculated as the difference between the three-month Euribor rate and three-month 
German Government BuBill. This measure can be considered a European equivalent of 
the widely used TED spread funding liquidity measure (Garleanu and Pedersen, 2011; 
Boudt et al, 2017) in the context of the European market. Secondly, in line with Moinas et 
al. (2018) and Dunne et al. (2013), we investigate a funding liquidity measure relying on 
repo rates, namely the Eurepo spread (EuRepo) calculated as the spread between the three-
month Euribor and three-month Eurepo rates. The Eurepo rate is collected from the 
European Money Market Institute database and represents the rate at which one prime 
bank offers funds in Euro to another prime bank, with the Eurepo General Collateral 
serving as the collateral in the transaction (Moinas et al, 2018). As suggested by Moinas et 
al. (2018), a higher Eurepo spread indicates higher risk aversion and a higher preference 
for cash.  
2.5 Control Variables 
We investigate the presence of a relationship between changes in funding illiquidity and 
spread changes, while controlling for a set of additional firm-specific and macro-economic 
credit risk and liquidity variables previously documented to impact CDS spreads. The 
choice of control variables is inspired by the Merton (1974) model and by more recent 
studies documenting the influence of liquidity and macroeconomic factors on CDS 
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spreads (e.g. Coro et al, 2013; Bongaerts et al, 2011; Annaert et al, 2013).  A summary of 
the explanatory variables as well as a summary of the expected relationships between the 
changes in explanatory variables and changes in CDS spreads are presented in Table 1. 
2.5.1 Stock return  
The model introduced by Merton (1974) suggests that a decrease in a firm’s market value 
of equity leads to a higher probability of default for the respective firm. In line with Galil 
et al. (2014), we use monthly stock returns as indicators of changes in a firm’s market 
value of equity. We expect a negative relationship between stock returns and CDS spread 
changes as a decrease in stock returns would increase the probability of default of the firm, 
which would be captured through an increase in the spread of the respective entity.  
2.5.2 Stock return volatility 
In the framework of Merton (1974), higher firm value volatility increases the probability 
of reaching the default threshold. Therefore, higher firm value volatility would increase 
the CDS spread of an entity. However, firm value volatility is unobservable, but can be 
approximated through the historical volatility of stock returns (Alexander and Kaeck, 
2008; Ericsson et al. 2009). Monthly volatility is measured as the monthly historical 
standard deviation of daily stock returns over the past month.  
2.5.3 CDS volatility 
High CDS volatility suggests that market participants revise their views on the 
creditworthiness of an entity quickly, reflecting uncertainty regarding the correct spread 
levels (Raunig, 2018). Therefore, an increase in CDS volatility is expected to lead to 
higher spreads, as CDS sellers seek compensation for increased uncertainty. CDS 
volatility is computed as the monthly historical standard deviation of daily spreads over 
the past month.   
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2.5.4 Scaled equity bid-ask spread 
In the framework of Das and Hanouna (2009), CDS contract sellers actively hedge their 
positions. Since the cost of hedging increases with transaction costs, CDS sellers attempt 
to recover the increased cost of hedging their positions through a higher spread level. 
Following Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Das and Hanouna (2009), we use the 
scaled equity bid-ask spread, measured as the difference between the ask and bid prices 
divided by the mid-point of the two, to proxy for equity illiquidity transaction costs which 
are expected to be positively related to CDS spreads.  
2.5.5 Absolute CDS bid-ask spread 
Tang and Yan (2008) and Pires et al. (2015) show that CDS illiquidity costs represent an 
important determinant of spreads. Moreover, Bongaerts et al. (2011) develop a model 
where CDS returns depend on CDS transaction costs, a liquidity premium being earned by 
the CDS contract seller. We follow Pires et al. (2015) and focus on the absolute, rather 
than the relative, bid-ask spread, as the authors convincingly show that the absolute 
measure should be used in the context of the CDS market.  
2.5.6 Risk-free rate 
The level of the riskless interest rate has been considered an important component of 
default probability since the model of Merton (1974). On one hand, an increase in the risk-
free interest rate decreases the risk-adjusted default probability leading to a decrease in 
spreads (Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995; Collin-Dufresne et al, 2001). On the other hand, 
as Coro et al. (2013) argue, higher interest rates can also suppress growth through an 
increase in borrowing costs leading to an increase in spreads, such an effect being more 
prominent in a period of increased sovereign risk such as seen in the European market 
starting from late 2009. Therefore, we consider the relationship between the riskless 
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interest rate and CDS spreads as undetermined and examine whether the effect of the risk-
free rate on spreads changes throughout the different sample periods. Following Coro et 
al. (2013), the risk-free rate is measured through the Euro-area government bond with a 
maturity of 10-years. 
2.5.7 Term structure slope 
Alexander and Kaeck (2008) and Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) suggest that an increase in 
the slope of the yield curve predicts economic growth and improves recovery rates, thus 
decreasing spreads. However, a steepening of the slope could also reduce the number of 
positive net present value projects available to firms, leading to an increase in default 
probability and an increase in spreads (Galil et al, 2014). Therefore, as with the risk-free 
rate, we leave the expected relationship between the slope of the term structure and CDS 
spreads as undetermined and examine whether the relationship changes within the 
different sub-samples investigated. The term-structure slope is measured through the 
difference between the ten-year and three-year Euro-area Government bond yields.  
2.5.8 Market-wide volatility 
Market-wide volatility can be considered a measure of business climate, an increase in 
market-wide volatility indicating heightened uncertainty regarding economic prospects, 
leading to an increase in spreads (Annaert et al, 2013; Greatrex, 2009). We measure 
market volatility through the VSTOXX implied volatility index obtained from options 
written on the Euro STOXX 50 index.   
3. Methodology 
To test the impact of funding illiquidity and other firm-specific and macroeconomic 
factors on CDS spread changes, we estimate a set of multivariate regressions depicted in 
equations (2), (3) and (4):  
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Model 1:  𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝛥𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽4𝛥𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆_𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                    (2) 
                                               
Model 2:  𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝛥𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝛥𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆_𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝛥𝐹𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                   (3) 
           
Model 3:  𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝛥𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝛥𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝛥𝐶𝐷𝑆_𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝛥𝐹𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽7𝛥𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽8𝛥𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒_𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 +
 𝛽9𝛥𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                (4) 
 
In the models presented in equations (2)-(4), the dependent variable is the monthly 
CDS spread change, while the explanatory variables are as described in Table 1. 𝛥𝐹𝐿𝑡 
measures the monthly funding liquidity changes and is proxied, in turn, by monthly 
changes in the three-month European TED spread (𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡) and three-month Eurepo 
spread (𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑡).  Model 1 estimates the impact of firm-specific credit and liquidity 
factors on spread changes. Model 2 augments Model 1 alternatively with the two funding 
illiquidity factors to examine the influence of changes in funding illiquidity on spread 
changes when controlling for firm-specific determinants. Lastly, Model 3 investigates the 
impact of funding illiquidity changes on spread changes when controlling for both firm-
specific and macro-economic factors. Following Coro et al. (2013), all three models are 
estimated using firm-level fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm to correct for 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.  
We estimate the above models on the entire sample of firms as well as on the top 
and bottom terciles (top and bottom 33%) of entities according to their spread levels. By 
performing these estimations, we can test whether spread changes of high spread (high 
default risk) firms react differently to changes in funding illiquidity and other explanatory 
variables than those of low spread (low risk) firms. In line with previous findings 
documented by Pires et al. (2015), we expect the effects of explanatory variables on 
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spread changes of high CDS firms to be larger in magnitude than on low CDS firms, as 
negative shocks to either credit or liquidity variables would drive high CDS entities, 
which carry more credit and liquidity risk, closer to the default barrier. 
Furthermore, we conduct a sub-sample analysis to isolate the effects of the 
regulatory changes introduced through the CDS Small Bang on June 20th, 2009. To this 
end, we split the sample in two sub-samples: a pre-CDS Small Bang period, from January 
2008 to June 2009, which also demarks the Global Financial Crisis period8, and a post-
CDS Small Bang period, from July 2009 to March 2013. We estimate the three models 
during the two sub-samples separately using the entire sample of firms as well as the top 
and bottom terciles of entities according to their spread levels. We expect changes in 
funding illiquidity to have a more pronounced effect on spread changes in the post-CDS 
Small Bang sample due to the introduction of an upfront fee, which increases the funding 
cost for trading CDSs, reducing traders’ willingness to trade, thus leading to a reduction in 
CDS market liquidity and an increase in spreads.  
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for our dependent and independent variables along 
with CDS spread and funding liquidity levels. Panel (a) presents summary statistics for the 
whole sample, while panels (b) and (c) present results for the pre-CDS Small Bang and 
post-CDS Small Bang periods, respectively. All variables are calculated with monthly 
frequency. Investigating panel (a), we note that the average CDS spread for the entire 
sample is 119.66 bps, while the mean monthly spread change is 1.09 bps. We also observe 
large variations in the CDS spread levels between entities, the lowest spread recorded 
                                                          
8 Galil et al. (2014) consider June 2009 as the last month of the most intense phase of the Global Financial 
Crisis. 
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being 20.53 bps, while the largest being 759.58 bps. Comparing the two funding liquidity 
measures, we note that the European TED spread has a larger mean value and displays 
higher volatility than the Eurepo spread. Moreover, monthly changes in the TED spread 
are, on average, larger in magnitude than those of the Eurepo spread.  
Comparing the summary statistics of the pre-CDS Small Bang and post-CDS Small 
Bang periods, we note that the average CDS spread as well as the monthly average spread 
changes are larger in the former period. Moreover, all illiquidity and volatility variables 
are larger in the pre-CDS Small Bang period, funding illiquidity being approximately two 
times higher during this sub-sample. Together, these statistics highlight the heightened 
default risk during the Global Financial Crisis.  
Table 3 presents time-series pairwise correlations between the explanatory variables 
included in our models. Panel (a) presents correlations observed throughout the whole 
sample, while Panels (b) and (c) illustrate the pairwise correlations during the pre-CDS 
Small Bang and post-CDS Small Bang periods, respectively. The signs of the correlations 
between the explanatory variables broadly confirm our expectations. The largest 
correlation of 0.68 is observed between the two funding liquidity proxies during the pre-
CDS Small Bang period. However, these two variables are only included alternatively in 
the regression models.9  
4.2 Results of regression estimations 
4.2.1 Results for the full time-series sample 
Table 4 presents the results of the multivariate regressions depicted in equations (2)-(4) for 
the entire time-series (January 2008 - March 2013). Panel (a) presents the results for the 
whole sample of firms, while panels (b) and (c) present the results for the sub-samples 
                                                          
9 Variance inflation factors corresponding to the explanatory variables presented in Model 3 do not typically 
exceed 2.  
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containing high and low CDS spread entities. We first draw our attention to panel (a). 
Model 1 reflects the ability of firm-specific credit and liquidity variables to explain spread 
changes. We find that stock returns and changes in equity and CDS volatility, equity bid-
ask spreads and CDS bid-ask spreads are highly significant determinants of CDS spread 
changes as previously documented by Coro et al. (2013), Pires et al. (2015) and Das and 
Hanouna (2009). Stock returns have an expected negative relationship with spread 
changes, while changes in volatility, equity bid-ask spreads and CDS bid-ask spreads 
display a positive relationship with spread changes. Together these variables explain 
36.10% of CDS spread changes. Investigating Model 2, we find that the two funding 
illiquidity proxies, 𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑇𝑒𝑑𝑡 and 𝛥𝐸𝑢𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑡, have a statistically significant positive 
relationship with CDS spread changes, in line with our hypothesis that a tightening of 
funding liquidity increases spreads. Coefficients of firm-specific explanatory variables 
remain significant and of the expected signs. Model 3 investigates the effect of funding 
illiquidity changes on CDS spread changes when controlling for both firm-specific and 
macroeconomic variables. This specification explains up to 38.94% of spread changes. We 
find that both funding illiquidity coefficients remain significant, while their magnitude 
drops by approximately a half when controlling for macroeconomic variables. 
Investigating the macroeconomic control variables, we find that changes in risk free rate 
have a significant negative relationship with spread changes, while market volatility 
increases spreads. These results are in line with our hypotheses and with results from 
previous studies such as Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001). Changes in the term structure slope 
do not have a significant impact on spread changes.  
Examining panels (b) and (c) of Table 4, we find that the positive relationship 
between funding illiquidity changes and spread changes remains significant when 
investigating high CDS firms’ and low CDS firms’ separately. The magnitude of the 
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funding effect is approximately three times larger when investigating high- spread entities 
compared to the funding effect on low-spread entities. This highlights the fact that high-
spread (higher default risk) entities are more sensitive to changes in funding conditions 
compared to low-spread (lower default risk) firms, consistent with the hypothesis that a 
tightening of funding liquidity would affect high risk firms more than low risk firms as 
investors shy away from riskier assets following a funding contraction (Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen, 2009). The coefficients of the variables explaining spread changes remain 
significant and of the same signs as in the estimation using the entire sample of firms, 
except for the coefficient of equity illiquidity which becomes insignificant when 
examining low spread entities. 
4.2.2 Sub-sample results  
Table 5 and Table 6 present the results of the multivariate regressions during the two sub-
samples: the pre-CDS Small Bang period (January 2008 – June 2009) and post-CDS Small 
Bang period (July 2009 – March 2013), respectively. Within Table 5 and Table 6, panel 
(a) presents results for the entire sample of firms, while panels (b) and (c) present results 
for the high-spread and low-spread firms within the two subsamples, respectively.  
Investigating Table 5, results suggest that funding illiquidity changes do not show a 
significant impact on CDS spread changes during the pre-CDS Small Bang period. We 
consider that this result arises because during the Global Financial Crisis, a period which 
overlaps with the pre-CDS Small Bang sub-sample, tightening of funding liquidity led to a 
reduction in CDS market liquidity and individual CDS illiquidity which dramatically 
increased the explanatory power of individual CDS illiquidity on CDS spread changes 
relative to explanatory factors. Indeed, the magnitude of the effect of CDS illiquidity 
changes on spread changes is much larger during the pre-CDS Small Bang period, 
compared to the period following the implementation of the regulatory changes. In a 
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related study, Annaert et al. (2013) shows that CDS bid-ask spreads have a more 
pronounced effect on changes in the CDS price during the Global Financial Crisis 
compared to the pre-crisis period and that the explanatory power of CDS bid-ask spreads 
in univariate regressions grows from 0.30% before the crisis to 6.96% during the crisis.10 
Moreover, we note that the coefficients relating to stock returns, equity volatility, changes 
in CDS bid-ask spreads, risk free rate and term-structure slope are generally significant in 
both high and low subsamples as well as when considering the whole sample of firms. 
Interestingly, we obtain larger adjusted 𝑅2 values, of up to 43.88%, when performing 
estimations on low spread entities suggesting that our explanatory variables explain better 
CDS spread changes of low-risk entities compared to those of high risk firms during this 
turbulent period. 
Examining Table 6, we note that funding illiquidity changes have a positive and 
highly significant effect on CDS spread changes in the post-CDS Small Bang period. This 
is in line with our expectation, since the introduction of an upfront fee to be paid for all 
CDS transactions when the spread is not equal to one of the fixed coupons introduced by 
the CDS Small Bang regulations brings about an additional cost incurred by CDS traders 
which reduces their willingness to trade, reducing CDS market liquidity (Wang et al, 
2018).11 In turn, this leads to a premium being demanded by CDS sellers to compensate 
for illiquidity, increasing spreads (Bongaerts et al, 2011; Coro et al, 2013). The effect of 
funding illiquidity changes on spread changes is approximately three to five times larger 
in size for high CDS firms compared to low CDS firms. We also document that stock 
returns and changes in equity volatility, CDS bid-ask spreads, slope yield and market 
                                                          
10 Employing univariate regressions, we further document that the explanatory power of CDS liquidity 
changes on spread changes is largest during the pre-CDS Small Bang sample, while funding liquidity 
changes tend to provide the highest explanatory power in relation to spread changes in the post-CDS Small 
Bang regime. Results are available upon request.  
11 Using multivariate regressions, we typically find that both funding liquidity proxies have a significant 
positive impact on CDS liquidity changes, confirming the transmission channel of funding costs to spreads. 
Results are available upon request.  
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volatility have a significant impact on spread changes when investigating the entire sample 
of firms as well as in the high and low-CDS subsamples. Interestingly, changes in risk-
free rate display a positive relationship with spread changes. Although surprising at first, 
this result is in line with the hypothesis that an increase in risk free rates increases 
borrowing costs, thus suppressing growth as is the case in the European market after the 
end of 2009 (Coro et al, 2013). During the post-CDS Small Bang period, we find that the 
models can explain a larger part of spread changes when evaluating high-CDS firms. This 
result is in line with the findings of Pires et al. (2015) who document that the goodness of 
fit of models explaining spreads increases with CDS premiums. We obtain adjusted 
𝑅2 values reaching up to 45.34% for the entire sample of firms and 50.55% for high-CDS 
firms. However, our models perform worse in explaining spread changes of low risk firms 
after the implementation of the CDS Small Bang regulations compared to the period 
preceding the regulatory changes. 
5. Robustness Checks 
To further investigate the change in the effects of funding illiquidity changes and of other 
explanatory variables on spread changes before and after the implementation of the CDS 
Small Bang regulations, we re-estimate Model 3 adding a dummy variable isolating the 
pre-CDS Small Bang period as well as interaction terms between all explanatory variables 
and the pre-CDS Small Bang dummy. The dummy takes the value of ‘1’ between January 
2008 and June 2009 and ‘0’ otherwise. We estimate this model on the whole sample of 
firms as well as, separately, on the high-CDS and low-CDS subsamples. Table 7 reports 
the results. We confirm that the positive effect of funding illiquidity changes on CDS 
spread changes is significantly lower in the pre-CDS Small Bang period, while the 
positive relationship between CDS illiquidity changes and spread changes is significantly 
larger in magnitude during this period. Additionally, we find that changes in the riskless 
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interest rate have a stronger negative impact on spread changes before the implementation 
of the regulatory changes and that the relationship between changes in the term structure 
slope and spreads changes its sign after the CDS Small Bang. This supports the mixed 
evidence found by literature regarding the influence of changes in risk free rate and term 
structure slope on spread changes. Taken together, these results suggest that the effect of 
funding liquidity as well as of other explanatory variables display a strong time-varying 
behaviour, as previously noted by Alexander and Kaeck (2008) and Annaert et al. (2013).  
Adding to the explanatory variables employed in the models estimated, we also 
considered estimating the effect of funding illiquidity changes on spread changes when 
accounting for the market return, as in Annaert et al. (2013). To proxy for market return 
we used the return on the Euro Stoxx 50 stock market index obtained from Thomson 
Datastream. However, due to the very large negative correlation between the market return 
and market volatility (-0.72 for the whole sample and -0.80 in the pre-CDS Small Bang 
sub-sample), we chose to report results for models using only market volatility to avoid 
multicollinearity. In unreported results, we note that there are no significant changes in the 
signs or magnitudes of the coefficients for the variables included in the models when 
replacing market volatility with the market return.  
6. Policy Recommendations 
The results of our analysis suggest that funding illiquidity changes are a significant 
determinant of CDS spread changes, especially during the period following the 
implementation of the CDS Small Bang regulatory framework in June 2009. While this 
result may be driven in part by the changing dynamics of the relationships between 
spreads and firm-specific liquidity factors and macroeconomic variables during our 
sample, the strong positive relationship between funding illiquidity changes and CDS 
spread changes observed post-June 2009 suggest the important role of the introduction of 
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an upfront fee for trading CDSs as fixed coupons have been rolled out. This creates a 
trade-off between the main benefit of standardization which aims to reduce systemic risk 
and a rise in upfront funding costs (Wang et al, 2018). As suggested by Wang et al. 
(2018), the introduction of the new fee increases CDS liquidity and CDS volatility for 
entities which have a spread further away from the fixed coupon at the time of the 
transaction, in turn leading to a widening of spreads. These effects highlight the 
importance of considering funding liquidity effects when evaluating CDS spreads and 
standardization policies (Wang et al. 2018).  
Furthermore, our results evidenced a pronounced time-varying effect of explanatory 
variables on spread changes, finding also documented by Alexander and Kaeck (2008) and 
Annaert et al. (2013). Particularly during market downturns such as the Global Financial 
Crisis, spreads display a higher sensitivity to CDS illiquidity and risk-free interest rates 
and a lower sensitivity to market volatility and funding liquidity. Therefore, in line with 
Annaert et al. (2013), we highlight the importance for regulators to constantly assess the 
relative importance of firm-specific credit risk and liquidity variables as well as 
macroeconomic variables in explaining spreads, so that the correct market signals are 
highlighted and appropriate policies are implemented. 
7. Conclusions 
This study explores the effect of funding illiquidity changes on CDS spread changes while 
controlling for other previously documented firm-specific and macroeconomic 
determinants of spreads. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study exploring the 
effect of changes in funding illiquidity on CDS spread changes. Using panel estimations, 
we find that changes in funding illiquidity have a significant positive effect on spread 
changes. This is in line with the hypothesis that a tightening of funding liquidity 
determines CDS protection sellers to reduce the supply of contracts in the market as they 
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incur inventory costs and worry about the costs of hedging their positions (Tang and Yan, 
2008). Moreover, we find that the effect of funding illiquidity changes on CDS spread 
changes is larger in magnitude and more statistically significant in the period following 
the implementation of the CDS Small Bang regulations. In line with Wang et al. (2018), 
we attribute this relationship to the introduction of an upfront fee that needs to be 
exchanged between the CDS protection buyer and CDS seller unless the spread of the 
respective entity at the time of the transaction is exactly equal to one of the four fixed 
coupons implemented through the CDS Small Bang. Moreover, we find that the 
magnitude of the effect of funding illiquidity changes on CDS spread changes is larger for 
high-CDS entities compared to low-CDS entities.  
By analysing our results, we can suggest two policy recommendations. Firstly, 
regulators need to consider the effect of funding illiquidity on CDS spreads when 
proposing new policy frameworks, our results suggesting that the introduction of the CDS 
Small Bang upfront fee creates a trade-off between standardization and funding costs, 
leading to a worsening of the linkage between funding conditions and CDS spreads as also 
suggested by Wang et al. (2018). Secondly, the time-varying nature of the relationships 
between explanatory variables and spread changes suggests that the determinants of CDS 
spreads need to be regularly investigated so that appropriate policies can be put in place 
according to what factors drive spreads in different periods.  
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Figure 1: Average CDS spreads and CDS spread changes 
In Figure 1, the solid line presents average CDS spread levels (Panel (a)) and average 
CDS spread changes (Panel (b)) for the entire sample of firms. The dotted lines present 
average CDS spread levels (Panel (a)) and average CDS spread changes (Panel (b)) for the 
top and bottom terciles of the respective distributions. The shaded area delimitates the 
period preceding the introduction of the CDS Small Bang regulatory changes (January 
2008 - June 2009). Sample consists of monthly data on 76 non-financial entities included 
in the European iTraxx index on March 2013. Sample period: January 2008 - March 2013. 
CDS spread levels data is obtained from Bloomberg. 
Panel (a): Average CDS spread levels 
 
Panel (b): Average CDS spread changes 
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Table 1: Description of variables explaining CDS spread changes 
Table 1 presents the explanatory variables used in panel regressions analysing CDS spread changes, their data source and predicted sign of the relationship 
with CDS spread changes. EMMI is the European Money Market Institute. 
Explanatory Variable Description 
Predicted 
Sign 
Data Source 
Stock_return Monthly stock return - 
Thomson 
Datastream 
          
ΔEquity_Vol Change in the historical standard deviation of stock returns + 
Thomson 
Datastream 
          
ΔCDS_Vol Change in the historical standard deviation of CDS spread levels + Bloomberg 
          
ΔEquity_BAS 
Change in the (scaled) difference between ask and bid equity prices, divided by 
the average of the two 
+ 
Thomson 
Datastream 
          
ΔCDS_BAS Change in the (absolute) difference between ask and bid CDS prices + Bloomberg 
          
ΔEuTed 
Change in the difference between the 3-month Euribor rate and the 3-month 
German Government BuBill  
+ Bloomberg 
          
ΔEuRepo 
Change in the difference between the 3-month Euribor rate and the 3-month 
Eurepo rate 
+ Bloomberg / EMMI  
          
ΔRisk-free Change in the 10-year Euro-area Government Bond Yield +/- Bloomberg 
          
ΔSlope_yield 
Change in the difference between the 10-year and 3-year Euro-area 
Government Bond Yield 
+/- Bloomberg 
          
ΔMkt_volatility 
Change in the implied volatility as measured by the Euro Stoxx 50 volatility 
index 
+ 
Thomson 
Datastream 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of the dataset 
Table 2 presents summary statistics of the European iTraxx index sample consisting of 76 non-financial 
firms examined throughout the study. Panel (a) presents summary statistics for the entire sample (January 
2008 - March 2013). Panel (b) presents summary statistics for the period preceding the CDS Small Bang 
(January 2008 - June 2009). Panel (c) presents summary statistics for the post-CDS Small Bang period (July 
2009 - March 2013). The statistics are calculated using a sample consisting of 76 non-financial companies 
included in the European iTraxx index. CDS represents the mid CDS spread (in basis points). ΔCDS is the 
monthly change in the mid-CDS spread (in basis points). All other variables are as described in Table 1. 
 
Panel (a): Whole Sample (January 2008 – March 2013) 
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
CDS 119.664 95.165 759.580 20.533 82.691 
ΔCDS 1.091 -0.185 472.219 -257.884 33.678 
Stock_return -0.407 0.173 53.375 -66.988 8.890 
ΔEquity_Vol -0.000 -0.041 20.071 -18.638 0.968 
ΔCDS_Vol 0.039 -0.168 133.171 -97.640 9.531 
ΔEquity_BAS 0.001 -0.001 8.906 -8.910 0.365 
ΔCDS_BAS 0.004 -0.039 28.114 -20.276 3.411 
EuTed 0.727 0.583 2.824 0.057 0.552 
ΔEuTed -0.012 -0.027 2.151 -1.029 0.362 
EuRepo 0.540 0.414 1.822 0.185 0.355 
ΔEuRepo -0.007 -0.008 0.663 -0.534 0.176 
ΔRisk-free -0.048 -0.043 0.411 -0.642 0.238 
ΔSlope_yield 0.016 0.007 0.621 -0.506 0.188 
ΔMkt_volatility 0.045 -1.194 20.29 -11.560 6.094 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of the dataset - continued 
 
Panel (b): Pre-CDS Small Bang period (January 2008 – June 2009) 
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
CDS 134.504 98.447 759.580 20.533 109.702 
ΔCDS 3.667 1.988 389.983 -257.884 49.718 
Stock_return -2.929 -2.303 53.375 -66.988 11.465 
ΔEquity_Vol 0.042 -0.053 20.071 -18.638 1.511 
ΔCDS_Vol 0.228 -0.224 133.171 -97.641 14.553 
ΔEquity_BAS 0.003 0.001 5.849 -5.712 0.259 
ΔCDS_BAS 0.266 -0.001 28.114 -20.276 3.840 
EuTed 1.172 0.928 2.824 0.479 0.774 
ΔEuTed -0.027 -0.075 2.151 -1.029 0.636 
EuRepo 0.813 0.736 1.822 0.394 0.398 
ΔEuRepo -0.012 -0.054 0.663 -0.534 0.279 
ΔRisk-free -0.051 -0.117 0.411 -0.642 0.272 
ΔSlope_yield 0.077 0.080 0.621 -0.296 0.217 
ΔMkt_volatility 0.677 -1.369 20.29 -9.233 8.166 
 
 
Panel (c): Post-CDS Small Bang period (July 2009 – March 2013) 
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
CDS 113.398 94.392 572.741 24.650 67.188 
ΔCDS 0.061 -0.548 472.219 -253.347 24.414 
Stock_return 0.603 0.775 34.979 -62.260 7.385 
ΔEquity_Vol -0.017 -0.038 3.792 -2.784 0.630 
ΔCDS_Vol -0.036 -0.162 131.366 -85.804 6.518 
ΔEquity_BAS 0.000 0.000 8.906 -8.910 0.399 
ΔCDS_BAS -0.101 -0.058 21.311 -19.647 3.218 
EuTed 0.550 0.499 1.377 0.057 0.291 
ΔEuTed -0.007 -0.017 0.559 -0.249 0.146 
EuRepo 0.431 0.345 1.216 0.185 0.271 
ΔEuRepo -0.005 -0.008 0.335 -0.248 0.110 
ΔRisk-free -0.047 -0.039 0.382 -0.553 0.223 
ΔSlope_yield -0.009 0.002 0.406 -0.506 0.170 
ΔMkt_volatility -0.208 -1.044 11.030 -11.560 5.011 
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Table 3: Time-series pairwise correlations of variables explaining CDS spread changes 
Table 3 presents time-series pairwise correlations of the explanatory variables used in panel regressions explaining CDS spread changes. Panel (a) presents 
correlations for the entire sample (January 2008 - March 2013). Panel (b) presents correlations for the pre-CDS Small Bang period (January 2008- June 
2009). Panel (c) presents correlations for the post-CDS Small Bang period. All variables are as described in Table 1. 
Panel (a): Whole sample (January 2008 – March 2013) 
ΔEquity_Vol -0.24                 
ΔCDS_Vol -0.17 0.35               
ΔEquity_BAS -0.03 0.04 0.02             
ΔCDS_BAS -0.16 0.05 0.08 0.03           
ΔEuTed -0.09 0.17 0.09 0.01 0.10         
ΔEuRepo -0.20 0.37 0.23 0.02 0.16 0.65       
ΔRisk-free 0.23 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.18 -0.10 -0.07     
ΔSlope_yield -0.07 0.24 0.16 -0.01 0.11 0.07 0.30 0.23   
ΔMkt_volatility -0.38 0.47 0.30 0.02 0.16 0.37 0.54 -0.34 0.20 
  Stock_return ΔEquity_Vol ΔCDS_Vol ΔEquity_BAS ΔCDS_BAS ΔEuTed ΔEuRepo ΔRisk-free ΔSlope_yield 
Panel (b): Pre-CDS Small Bang period (January 2008 – June 2009) 
ΔEquity_Vol -0.21                 
ΔCDS_Vol -0.22 0.38               
ΔEquity_BAS -0.01 0.05 0.01             
ΔCDS_BAS -0.18 0.07 0.16 0.08           
ΔEuTed -0.13 0.23 0.13 0.04 0.13         
ΔEuRepo -0.21 0.45 0.33 0.04 0.11 0.68       
ΔRisk-free 0.20 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.38 -0.13 0.04     
ΔSlope_yield -0.16 0.34 0.30 -0.01 0.10 0.06 0.31 -0.02   
ΔMkt_volatility -0.39 0.61 0.43 0.03 0.16 0.45 0.66 -0.06 0.54 
  Stock_return ΔEquity_Vol ΔCDS_Vol ΔEquity_BAS ΔCDS_BAS ΔEuTed ΔEuRepo ΔRisk-free ΔSlope_yield 
Panel (c): Post-CDS Small Bang period (July 2009 – March 2013) 
ΔEquity_Vol -0.28                 
ΔCDS_Vol -0.12 0.29               
ΔEquity_BAS -0.04 0.05 0.03             
ΔCDS_BAS -0.13 0.05 0.01 0.02           
ΔEuTed -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.07         
ΔEuRepo -0.23 0.17 0.02 0.02 0.24 0.55       
ΔRisk-free 0.27 -0.06 -0.07 0.00 -0.06 -0.09 -0.23     
ΔSlope_yield 0.06 0.13 0.01 -0.01 0.11 0.15 0.37 0.39   
ΔMkt_volatility -0.37 0.26 0.11 0.02 0.16 0.27 0.39 -0.57 -0.11 
  Stock_return ΔEquity_Vol ΔCDS_Vol ΔEquity_BAS ΔCDS_BAS ΔEuTed ΔEuRepo ΔRisk-free ΔSlope_yield 
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Table 4: Determinants of CDS spread changes 
Table 4 presents coefficient estimates of panel regressions explaining CDS spread changes.  Panel (a) 
presents results for all sample of firms. Panel (b) presents results for high CDS spread firms (top 
tercile of firms CDS spreads). Panel (c) presents results for low CDS spread firms (bottom tercile of 
firms CDS spreads). The dependent variable is the change in the CDS mid-price. All explanatory 
variables are as described in Table 1. Regressions estimated using firm-level fixed effects and 
standard errors clustered by firm to correct for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. Sample period: January 2008 - March 2013. 
 
 
 
Panel (a): Whole Sample of firms 
 
 
Dep. Var: ΔCDS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 0.66*** 0.74*** 0.77*** -0.14 -0.12 
  (17.82) (16.56) (15.96) (-0.92) (-0.72) 
Stock_return -0.95*** -0.95*** -0.93*** -0.76*** -0.75*** 
  (-10.99) (-10.79) (-10.46) (-8.05) (-7.89) 
ΔEquity_Vol 3.34*** 2.99*** 2.62*** 2.29*** 2.17*** 
  (4.45) (4.17) (3.70) (3.38) (3.22) 
ΔCDS_Vol 0.75*** 0.74*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.71*** 
  (4.70) (4.62) (4.41) (4.26) (4.19) 
ΔEquity_BAS 3.31** 3.29** 3.32** 3.31** 3.31** 
  (2.17) (2.21) (2.22) (2.35) (2.35) 
ΔCDS_BAS 3.91*** 3.86*** 3.83*** 3.62*** 3.61*** 
  (12.75) (12.41) (12.20) (11.13) (11.09) 
ΔEuTed   6.05***   3.13**   
    (4.59)   (2.56)   
ΔEuRepo     13.19***   7.33*** 
      (4.18)   (2.83) 
ΔRisk-free       -18.69*** -18.87*** 
        (-6.04) (-6.10) 
ΔSlope_yield       0.47 -0.73 
        (0.22) (-0.36) 
ΔMkt_volatility       0.44*** 0.41*** 
        (3.73) (3.90) 
N 4788 4788 4788 4788 4788 
Adj. R2 36.10% 36.50% 36.49% 38.94% 38.93% 
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Table 4: Determinants of CDS spread changes - continued 
Panel (b): High CDS entities 
 
Dep. Var: ΔCDS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 1.05*** 1.21*** 1.27*** -0.70** -0.64** 
  (12.88) (10.93) (11.52) (-2.30) (-2.02) 
Stock_return -1.28*** -1.26*** -1.21*** -0.94*** -0.92*** 
  (-8.42) (-8.12) (-7.69) (-5.39) (-5.08) 
ΔEquity_Vol 5.97*** 5.46*** 5.01*** 4.18*** 4.00*** 
  (5.46) (5.50) (5.22) (4.68) (4.52) 
ΔCDS_Vol 0.60*** 0.58*** 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.52*** 
  (3.14) (3.04) (2.79) (2.87) (2.72) 
ΔEquity_BAS 3.32** 3.22** 3.36** 3.42** 3.48** 
  (1.99) (2.04) (2.05) (2.30) (2.29) 
ΔCDS_BAS 4.04*** 3.98*** 3.94*** 3.60*** 3.58*** 
  (9.61) (9.41) (9.12) (8.33) (8.18) 
ΔEuTed   11.70***   6.82**   
    (3.58)   (2.28)   
ΔEuRepo     25.08***   15.63** 
      (3.36)   (2.48) 
ΔRisk-free       -38.42*** -38.83*** 
        (-6.07) (-6.16) 
ΔSlope_yield       9.19* 6.74 
        (1.76) (1.37) 
ΔMkt_volatility       0.67*** 0.64*** 
        (2.70) (2.78) 
N 1638 1638 1638 1638 1638 
Adj. R2 36.15% 36.83% 36.75% 40.75% 40.73% 
 
 
Panel (c): Low CDS entities 
 
Dep. Var: ΔCDS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 0.39*** 0.45*** 0.47*** 0.11 0.12* 
  (47.80) (25.94) (20.93) (1.49) (1.75) 
Stock_return -0.53*** -0.53*** -0.52*** -0.38*** -0.38*** 
  (-11.53) (-11.21) (-10.94) (-7.29) (-7.13) 
ΔEquity_Vol 1.71*** 1.38** 0.93 0.37 0.30 
  (2.85) (2.34) (1.63) (0.63) (0.52) 
ΔCDS_Vol 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.34*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 
  (5.33) (5.14) (4.76) (4.16) (4.07) 
ΔEquity_BAS -0.38 -0.18 -0.30 0.46 0.36 
  (-0.23) (-0.12) (-0.21) (0.43) (0.34) 
ΔCDS_BAS 3.42*** 3.32*** 3.29*** 3.04*** 3.05*** 
  (13.75) (13.93) (13.91) (11.89) (11.88) 
ΔEuTed   4.51***   2.11**   
    (4.48)   (2.30)   
ΔEuRepo     10.69***   4.12* 
      (4.04)   (1.80) 
ΔRisk-free       -6.14*** -6.21*** 
        (-4.92) (-4.95) 
ΔSlope_yield       0.76 0.05 
        (0.56) (0.04) 
ΔMkt_volatility       0.47*** 0.46*** 
        (6.47) (7.09) 
N 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 
Adj. R2 34.47% 35.73% 35.92% 40.23% 40.15% 
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Table 5: Determinants of CDS spread changes – Pre-CDS Small Bang period 
Table 5 presents estimates of panel regressions explaining CDS spread changes before the 
implementation of the CDS Small Bang regulatory changes. Panel (a) presents results for all sample 
of firms. Panel (b) presents results for high CDS spread firms (top tercile of firms CDS spreads). 
Panel (c) presents results for low CDS spread firms (bottom tercile of firms CDS spreads). The 
dependent variable is the change in the CDS mid-price. All explanatory variables are as described in 
Table 1. Regressions estimated using firm-level fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm to 
correct for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels. Sample period: January 2008 - 
June 2009. 
 
 
 
Panel (a): All firms 
 
 
Dep. Var: ΔCDS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -0.33 -0.24 -0.32 -1.88*** -1.87*** 
  (-0.64) (-0.43) (-0.61) (-3.03) (-3.17) 
Stock_return -0.71*** -0.71*** -0.71*** -0.57*** -0.57*** 
  (-5.04) (-4.87) (-5.03) (-3.28) (-3.20) 
ΔEquity_Vol 3.57*** 3.42*** 3.53*** 2.89*** 2.88*** 
  (4.30) (4.28) (4.41) (3.44) (3.52) 
ΔCDS_Vol 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.71*** 0.71*** 
  (4.18) (4.14) (4.16) (4.16) (4.16) 
ΔEquity_BAS 4.96 4.89 4.96 4.56 4.57 
  (1.56) (1.55) (1.56) (1.60) (1.60) 
ΔCDS_BAS 5.95*** 5.92*** 5.95*** 5.15*** 5.15*** 
  (8.96) (8.68) (8.93) (6.50) (6.53) 
ΔEuTed   1.84   0.24   
    (1.08)   (0.18)   
ΔEuRepo     0.59   0.23 
      (0.17)   (0.05) 
ΔRisk-free       -28.74*** -28.82*** 
        (-3.74) (-3.60) 
ΔSlope_yield       8.16* 8.00* 
        (1.89) (1.78) 
ΔMkt_volatility       0.17 0.18 
        (0.79) (0.72) 
N 1368 1368 1368 1368 1368 
Adj. R2 36.53% 36.53% 36.48% 38.72% 38.71% 
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Table 5: Determinants of CDS spread changes – Pre-CDS Small Bang period - continued 
Panel (b): High CDS entities 
 
Dep. Var: ΔCDS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -0.15 0.04 0.11 -3.78*** -3.59*** 
  (-0.12) (0.03) (0.09) (-2.77) (-2.82) 
Stock_return -1.11*** -1.10*** -1.09*** -0.97*** -0.97*** 
  (-3.72) (-3.58) (-3.73) (-3.12) (-2.97) 
ΔEquity_Vol 7.51*** 7.27*** 7.06*** 6.60*** 6.42*** 
  (6.05) (5.74) (6.98) (5.40) (5.49) 
ΔCDS_Vol 0.43** 0.42** 0.40** 0.44* 0.42* 
  (2.31) (2.26) (2.06) (1.91) (1.86) 
ΔEquity_BAS 3.94 3.69 3.85 4.83 4.86 
  (1.39) (1.29) (1.32) (1.63) (1.60) 
ΔCDS_BAS 6.25*** 6.20*** 6.24*** 4.78*** 4.74*** 
  (6.44) (6.21) (6.36) (3.72) (3.66) 
ΔEuTed   4.27   1.67   
    (1.03)   (0.48)   
ΔEuRepo     9.71   13.63 
      (0.87)   (1.18) 
ΔRisk-free       -60.16*** -61.95*** 
        (-3.12) (-3.07) 
ΔSlope_yield       22.24** 22.46* 
        (1.98) (1.83) 
ΔMkt_volatility       0.14 -0.06 
        (0.22) (-0.10) 
N 468 468 468 468 468 
Adj. R2 34.66% 34.64% 34.61% 38.33% 38.46% 
 
 
 
Panel (c): Low CDS entities 
 
Dep. Var: ΔCDS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -1.01*** -0.93*** -1.02*** -1.52*** -1.55*** 
  (-4.14) (-3.45) (-3.85) (-4.25) (-4.30) 
Stock_return -0.53*** -0.52*** -0.53*** -0.39*** -0.37*** 
  (-5.25) (-5.04) (5.31) (-3.26) (-3.17) 
ΔEquity_Vol 2.70*** 2.52*** 2.76*** 1.34 1.41 
  (3.54) (3.21) (3.25) (1.27) (1.34) 
ΔCDS_Vol 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.03 0.04 
  (1.36) (1.24) (1.43) (0.31) (0.36) 
ΔEquity_BAS 3.20** 3.07** 3.21** 2.98** 3.07** 
  (2.15) (2.02) (2.15) (1.98) (2.05) 
ΔCDS_BAS 5.41*** 5.34*** 5.41*** 4.73*** 4.75*** 
  (5.52) (5.41) (5.52) (4.54) (4.59) 
ΔEuTed   1.61   0.53   
    (1.65)   (0.50)   
ΔEuRepo     -0.53   -5.16 
      (-0.15)   (-1.51) 
ΔRisk-free       -8.97*** -8.82*** 
        (-3.14) (-3.05) 
ΔSlope_yield       4.41* 3.34 
        (1.83) (1.29) 
ΔMkt_volatility       0.31* 0.46*** 
        (1.86) (3.53) 
N 450 450 450 450 450 
Adj. R2 41.51% 41.64% 41.37% 43.57% 43.88% 
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Table 6: Determinants of CDS spread changes – Post-CDS Small Bang period 
Table 6 presents estimates of panel regressions explaining CDS spread changes after the 
implementation of the CDS Small Bang regulatory changes.  Panel (a) presents results for all sample 
of firms. Panel (b) presents results for high CDS spread firms (top tercile of firms CDS spreads). 
Panel (c) presents results for low CDS spread firms (bottom tercile of firms CDS spreads). The 
dependent variable is the change in the CDS mid-price. All explanatory variables are as described in 
Table 1. Regressions estimated using firm-level fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm to 
correct for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Sample period: July 2009 – March 2013. 
 
 
 
Panel (a): All firms 
 
 
Dep. Var: ΔCDS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 1.13*** 1.31*** 1.25*** 1.34*** 1.56*** 
  (13.33) (13.73) (14.66) (10.57) (12.47) 
Stock_return -1.19*** -1.16*** -1.07*** -0.96*** -0.88*** 
  (-10.66) (-10.75) (-9.83) (-8.45) (-7.84) 
ΔEquity_Vol 2.94*** 3.01*** 1.90** 2.18*** 1.51* 
  (3.23) (3.33) (2.25) (2.71) (1.89) 
ΔCDS_Vol 0.72** 0.75** 0.75** 0.73** 0.74** 
  (2.18) (2.28) (2.19) (2.07) (2.06) 
ΔEquity_BAS 2.71** 2.67** 2.69** 2.69** 2.60** 
  (2.16) (2.29) (2.37) (2.34) (2.41) 
ΔCDS_BAS 2.77*** 2.68*** 2.43*** 2.60*** 2.40*** 
  (9.71) (9.86) (8.04) (8.82) (7.71) 
ΔEuTed   29.66***   23.40***   
    (11.34)   (8.38)   
ΔEuRepo     46.40***   50.08*** 
      (11.45)   (14.58) 
ΔRisk-free       2.48* 8.77*** 
        (1.74) (5.98) 
ΔSlope_yield       -10.40*** -21.96*** 
        (-5.18) (-10.14) 
ΔMkt_volatility       0.95*** 0.91*** 
        (6.95) (7.42) 
N 3420 3420 3420 3420 3420 
Adj. R2 37.31% 40.51% 41.24% 43.91% 45.34% 
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Table 6: Determinants of CDS spread changes – Post-CDS Small Bang period - continued 
Panel (b): High CDS entities 
 
Dep. Var: ΔCDS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 1.57*** 1.84*** 1.75*** 1.93*** 2.26*** 
  (16.35) (15.55) (16.99) (7.87) (9.22) 
Stock_return -1.67*** -1.59*** -.1.41*** -1.19*** -1.05*** 
  (-12.87) (-12.48) (-11.04) (-9.79) (-8.41) 
ΔEquity_Vol 6.93*** 7.39*** 5.56*** 5.47*** 4.28*** 
  (4.67) (5.21) (4.13) (4.24) (3.57) 
ΔCDS_Vol 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.11 
  (1.07) (1.19) (1.13) (0.77) (0.89) 
ΔEquity_BAS 2.92* 2.79** 3.00** 2.69** 2.73** 
  (1.93) (2.10) (2.13) (2.27) (2.28) 
ΔCDS_BAS 2.68*** 2.56*** 2.27*** 2.42*** 2.17*** 
  (9.03) (9.93) (7.96) (9.06) (7.70) 
ΔEuTed 
 
48.00***   36.17***   
  
 
(8.65)   (6.39)   
ΔEuRepo 
 
  75.82***   77.94*** 
  
 
  (14.78)   (14.86) 
ΔRisk-free 
 
    3.45 12.99*** 
  
 
    (0.88) (3.27) 
ΔSlope_yield 
 
    -11.90** -29.42*** 
  
 
    (-2.39) (-5.71) 
ΔMkt_volatility 
 
    1.79*** 1.77*** 
  
 
    (9.23) (8.81) 
N 1170 1170 1170 1170 1170 
Adj. R2 39.39% 43.68% 44.51% 48.80% 50.55% 
  
 
 
Panel (c): Low CDS entities 
 
Dep. Var: ΔCDS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 0.61*** 0.67*** 0.65*** 0.59*** 0.69*** 
  (8.38) (9.13) (9.78) (6.30) (7.58) 
Stock_return -0.55*** -0.55*** -0.50*** -0.39*** -0.35*** 
  (-8.50) (-8.49) (-8.50) (-6.69) (-6.56) 
ΔEquity_Vol 1.85*** 1.82*** 1.08** 1.23** 1.03* 
  (3.34) (3.21) (2.20) (2.00) (1.93) 
ΔCDS_Vol -0.06 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 
  (-0.67) (0.20) (-0.15) (-0.40) (-0.35) 
ΔEquity_BAS -0.76 -0.12 -0.69 0.71 0.25 
  (-0.93) (-0.19) (-1.17) (0.90) (0.36) 
ΔCDS_BAS 1.42*** 1.38*** 0.98*** 1.24*** 1.00*** 
  (5.89) (5.96) (5.08) (5.31) (5.11) 
ΔEuTed   11.03***   6.40***   
    (5.73)   (3.77)   
ΔEuRepo     26.79***   28.35*** 
      (10.32)   (9.69) 
ΔRisk-free       1.17 4.58*** 
        (1.20) (4.47) 
ΔSlope_yield       -5.15*** -12.91*** 
        (-3.75) (-7.73) 
ΔMkt_volatility       0.61*** 0.51*** 
        (12.09) (10.20) 
N 1125 1125 1125 1125 1125 
Adj. R2 21.58% 24.70% 31.33% 34.67% 41.30% 
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Table 7: Determinants of CDS spread changes with pre-CDS Small Bang interaction effects 
Table 7 presents the determinants of CDS spread changes using panel regressions with pre-CDS 
Small Bang interaction effects. Panel (a) presents results for the entire firm sample. Panel (b) presents 
results for the high CDS firms (top tercile of CDS spread distribution). Panel (c) presents results for 
low CDS firms (bottom tercile of CDS spread distribution). Pre-SB is a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 during the period preceding the CDS Small Bang (January 2008 - June 2009) and 0 
otherwise. Regressions estimated using firm-level fixed effects and firm-clustered standard errors to 
correct for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. t-statistics presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Sample: January 2008 
– March 2013. 
 
Dep.Var: ΔCDS Panel (a): All sample Panel (b): High CDS Panel (c): Low CDS 
Constant 1.34*** 1.56*** 1.52*** 1.82*** 0.81*** 0.93*** 
    (7.84) (9.23) (3.58) (4.22) (6.66) (7.52) 
Stock_return -0.96*** -0.87*** -1.10*** -0.96*** -0.42*** -0.36*** 
    (-8.50) (-7.90) (-6.35) (-5.56) (-7.28) (-7.09) 
ΔEquity_Vol 2.20*** 1.52* 5.53*** 4.56*** 0.81 0.35 
    (2.73) (1.91) (4.67) (4.15) (1.28) (0.60) 
ΔCDS_Vol 0.73** 0.74** 0.24* 0.25* 0.32*** 0.32*** 
    (2.08) (2.07) (1.81) (1.80) (2.90) (3.01) 
ΔEquity_BAS 2.69** 2.59** 2.68** 2.67** 0.65 -0.18 
    (2.35) (2.41) (2.29) (2.31) (1.05) (-0.39) 
ΔCDS_BAS 2.61*** 2.41*** 2.52*** 2.27*** 1.72*** 1.38*** 
    (8.88) (7.76) (9.39) (7.94) (6.10) (5.82) 
ΔEuTed 23.42***   34.93***   9.92***   
    (8.41)   (6.53)   (5.04)   
ΔEuRepo   50.05***   75.22***   32.99*** 
      (14.64)   (14.31)   (9.81) 
ΔRisk-free 2.48* 8.77*** 0.14 9.46*** 3.12*** 7.01*** 
    (1.75) (6.00) (0.04) (2.61) (2.93) (5.83) 
ΔSlope_yield -10.43*** -21.97*** -9.62** -26.93*** -5.06*** -13.33*** 
    (-5.21) (-10.18) (-2.03) (-5.39) (-4.02) (-8.70) 
ΔMkt_volatility 0.95*** 0.91*** 1.72*** 1.69*** 0.64*** 0.55*** 
    (6.97) (7.44) (8.38) (8.02) (9.85) (-8.32) 
Pre-SB -3.22*** -3.43*** -4.70*** -4.86*** -2.01*** -2.18*** 
    (-6.15) (-6.83) (-4.07) (-4.37) (-5.78) (-6.37) 
Stock_return* Pre-SB 0.39* 0.31 0.30 0.17 0.08 0.03 
    (1.93) (1.52) (0.80) (0.46) (0.79) (0.28) 
ΔEquity_Vol* Pre-SB 0.71 1.38 -1.03 -0.20 -0.82 -0.33 
    (0.68) (1.33) (-0.58) (-0.12) (-0.70) (-0.27) 
ΔCDS_Vol* Pre-SB -0.01 -0.03 0.45** 0.42** -0.03 -0.03 
    (-0.04) (-0.07) (2.18) (1.97) (-0.18) (-0.17) 
ΔEquity_BAS* Pre-SB 1.82 1.92 2.74 2.86 -5.35 -4.23 
    (0.58) (0.62) (0.75) (0.77) (-0.42) (-0.33) 
ΔCDS_BAS* Pre-SB 2.56*** 2.77*** 2.16** 2.38** 3.21*** 3.56*** 
    (3.39) (3.66) (2.02) (2.23) (4.00) (-7.44) 
ΔEuTed* Pre-SB -23.18***   -31.48***   -10.05***   
    (-8.14)   (-5.30)   (-4.50)   
ΔEuRepo* Pre-SB   -49.85***   -65.74***   -35.39*** 
      (-10.44)   (-6.33)   (-7.44) 
ΔRisk-free * Pre-SB -31.11*** -37.47*** -60.80*** -71.83*** -14.66*** -18.35*** 
    (-4.06) (-4.65) (-3.14) (-3.57) (-4.20) (-4.94) 
ΔSlope_yield * Pre-SB 18.58*** 29.95*** 30.31** 46.07*** 7.99*** 16.11*** 
    (3.65) (5.35) (2.31) (3.21) (3.03) (6.14) 
ΔMkt_volatility* Pre-SB -0.79*** -0.74*** -1.64*** -1.63*** -0.11 0.02 
    (-3.19) (-2.78) (-3.16) (-2.94) (-0.77) (0.16) 
N 4788 4788 1638 1638 1575 1575 
Adj. R2 42.38% 42.92% 44.42% 44.98% 46.30% 48.64% 
 
